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NEIGHBORLY CONDUCT versus PROPERTY IN MINERALS.
In Higgins Oil & Fuel Company v. Guaranty Oil Company, Ltd.
(1919, La.) 82 So. 206, the defendant's duty to be neighborly was
upheld and his privileges in using his land to dig for oil were corre-
spondingly narrowed. The defendant had sunk an oil well on his land
which caused air to get into the plaintiff's pump in a well on the
latter's land, resulting in a great decrease in the productivity of the
plaintiff's well. Although the defendant's well was a non-producer
and could be closed without trouble or expense by simply putting back
a plug, the defendant refused to close it. The court discusses both
civil and common-law authorities and decides that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief.
The decision in its delimitation of the point where the defendant's
privileges resulting from ownership cease, and the plaintiff's rights
begin, is in accord with the position taken by Professor Summers in
his article in this number of the Journal.' While agreeing entirely with
Professor Summers' conclusions, the writer suggests that an analysis
distinguishing between plaintiff's rights and defendant's privileges
would have made his points even clearer than they now appear. For
it would seem that courts, at least partly because of the use of complex
conceptions, have taken a long road in order at length to reach a near
goal.
As Professor Summers shows, the development of the law both of
percolating streams and of oils and gases has been in this wise. Courts
have seen before them the interest of the owner of the land where
such minerals are found, and from this view have stated the "absolute
ownership" doctrine, namely, that the landowner is the absolute owner
of the minerals either solid or fluid or gaseous found on or in his land.
This rule was found to do injustice to the neighboring landowner, and
the opposite extreme was then suggested, that is, that one does not
"own!' such minerals until they are definitely appropriated. It does
not seem to have been perceived that ownership was merely a term
referring to an aggregate of legal relations in the "owner" and hence
denoted the number rather than the kind of such relations, nor that
there was no fixed number of such relations beyond which the owner-
ship would be "absolute" instead of "qualified." 2 A realization of this
meaning of the term would have developed that "absolute ownership"
was not inconsistent with certain duties to one's neighbor as regards
the subject matter of ownership. But the courts went to the other
extreme and are only now coming back to the middle view which
recognizes that in the legal relations which go to make up ownership
of oils and gases, there are in both landowner and neighbor duties in
addition to privileges (in the cases often termed rights), as well as
1 (1gIg) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 174.
2 Cook (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 729.
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numerous other legal relations. 3 Thus the landowner has a privilege
and a power of appropriation of minerals in his land, while his
neighbor has a like privilege and power, and each are subject to the
liability to have such appropriation made by the other.- But each
owes the other a duty not to waste or pollute such minerals, and the
courts will enforce this duty.5
It is not suggested that this analysis settles the ultimate question,
which is where the line between the privileges of one and the rights of
the other should be drawn. That question can only be settled by
weighing the arguments based upon public policy and convenience.
It is urged, however, that it does bring the court shortly to this ultimate
question without filming it over by such indefinite terms as absolute
ownership. And therefore the courts should more shortly reach the
necessary result, that is, the decision as to what public policy does
require in this particular instance.
The principal case presented less question on this point than many
others, for there the defendant did not even benefit himself by his
act. In the case of percolating water there is much authority to the
effect that one may be restrained from committing acts which without
benefit to himself deprive his neighbor of such water.6 And this
tendency to give a plaintiff a remedy where the only effect of the
defendant's acts is to damage the plaintiff without gain to the defend-
ant, may be found in the law of torts generally.7 Our ideas of property
may not have advanced to the point where this tendency may be
developed in the case of ownership of the land itself, but it certainly
may be given effect in a case where, as with minerals, the interests of
adjoining landowners seem of equal merit and hence the conflict to
extend the rights of one and the privileges of the other, is the sharper.
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"RENVOI" IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
A decision of the French Court of Cassation, known as the Forgo
Case.' raised a problem of the most fundamental importance in the
"There is a middle ground between the existence of an absolute and indefeasi-
ble right and the absence of any right that the law will recognize and protect.
There is room for the existence of qualified and correlative rights in both
landowners." Meeker v. City of East Orange (igo9, Ct. Err.) 77 N. J. L. 623,
74 Atl. 379.
'So stated in the principal case. See also cases cited by Professor Summers,
p. 176, note 9, supra.
'Cases cited p. 184, notes 3o and 31, supra.
' Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co. (I9O4) 163 Ind. 687, 72 N. E. 849,
68 L. R. A. 175, note; Barclay v. Abraham (1903) 121 Iowa, 61g, 96 N. W. io8o;
Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer (19o3) 89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W. 9o7; contra,
Phelps v. Nowlen (1878) 72 N. Y. 39; Bradford v. Pickles, L. R. [1895] A. C.
587; Chatfield v. Wilson (i855) 28 Vt. 49. Cases are collected at p. 176, note 6,
supra.
' (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 507; (907) 2o HARV. L. Rxv. 262-3.
'Cass. June 24, 1878, Dalloz, 1879, x, 56.
